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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Plaintiff was granted ten (10) days to amend its complaint at the hearing held 
on February 16, 2005. Defendant was also instructed to respond to the amended 
complaint in writing. Plaintiffs counsel was then granted thirty (30) days from the date 
of Defendant's answer to the amended complaint to respond to Defendant's pending 
discovery. As Plaintiff's counsel prepared the amended complaint, he inadvertently 
thought he had thirty days in which to file the amended complaint. 
Rule 6(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP) states that the court may extend a 
deadline "with or without motion or notice" for good cause. Rule 6(b)(2) states that after 
the expiration of a deadline, the party may move the court for an extension based on 
excusable neglect. In this case, Plaintiffs filing of the amended complaint served as an 
implied motion to extend the deadline. The district court's admission of the amended 
complaint, coupled with the lack of objection by the Defendant, worked to grant 
Plaintiff's implied motion to extend the deadline. 
While Plaintiffs amended complaint was not filed in accordance with the 
February 16, 2005 hearing, the Defendant did not suffer any harm and was not prejudiced 
in any way. No motions were filed by the Defendant prior to the filing of Plaintiffs 
amended complaint, and Defendant never moved to strike the amended complaint. 
Defendant waived her right to enforce the deadline when she failed to move to strike the 
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amended complaint. The Defendant did not raise the timeliness issue in her subsequent 
filings, but again complained that Plaintiff had not responded to her discovery. 
Therefore, Defendant's argument that it was reversible error for the trial court to allow 
the amended complaint must fail. 
2. Defendant's response to the amended complaint was not a 12(b) motion and 
did not invoke the time requirements of Rule 12 URCP. The Defendant argues that her 
March 23, 2005 filing titled "Motion for Default Judgment and/or to compel answers to 
Requests for Admission and Production of Documents" should be construed as a 12(b) 
motion. A review of the filing, however, does not support that assertion. All averments 
and assertions made in the document pertain to discovery and the Defendant's request to 
have the requests for admissions deemed admitted. 
The Defendant's March 23, 2005 seemed to address discovery matters as she cited 
rules 36, 37, 54, and 55. The Defendant demonstrated some knowledge of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure by listing the rules which support her legal arguments. Nowhere in the 
document does the Defendant cite Rule 12, or even use the terminology of Rule 12. 
Defendant does not ask for "dismissal", but requested the district court enter "default 
judgment" based on Plaintiff's alleged lack of responses to discovery. Therefore, 
Defendant's assertion that the March 23, 2005 filing is a motion to dismiss under rule 12 
is not supported by the four corners of the document and must fail. 
3. Defendant argues that her April 5, 2005 filing, titled "Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment and Defendants Answer to Plaintiffs 
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Amended Complaint" should be construed as an answer to the amended complaint. In 
support of this proposition, Defendant states that the April 5, 2005 filing "generally" 
disputes the amended complaint and specifically addresses two paragraphs of the 
amended complaint. 
While the April 5, 2005 filing states in the heading that the document serves as an 
answer to the amended complaint, the document is completely devoid of any denial or 
admission of the allegations set forth in the amended complaint. Rule 8(b) URCP states 
that "[a] party shall state in short and plaint terms his defenses to each claim asserted and 
shall admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies." Plaintiff is unable 
to identify any "short and plain" statements which "admit or deny" the averments of the 
amended complaint in the April 5, 2005 filing, and for this reason, the trial court correctly 
ruled that judgment on the pleadings was proper. 
In the April 5, 2005 filing, the Defendant again insisted that the Plaintiff respond 
to her discovery. If liberally construed at all, it would be construed as a motion to compel 
discovery, not a substantive answer to the amended complaint. Therefore, the April 5, 
2005 filing did not comply with Rule 8(b) URCP and judgment on the pleadings was 
appropriate. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. IT WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
ALLOW THE AMENDED COMPLAINT TO STAND. 
The trial court did not commit reversible error when it allowed Plaintiffs amended 
complaint to stand as the Defendant did not suffer any injury and did not oppose the 
untimely filing of the amended complaint. At the February 16, 2005 hearing, Plaintiff 
was allowed ten (10) days to amend the complaint, Defendant was instructed to file a 
written answer to the amended complaint, and Plaintiff was granted thirty (30) days from 
the filing of the answer to respond to Defendant's discovery. (Brief of Appellant, Exhibit 
No. 2, Tr. p. 39). Due to excusable neglect, Plaintiff filed the amended complaint 
approximately fourteen (14) days beyond the deadline given by the district court. 
Defendant, however, failed to object and the district court allowed the amended complaint 
to stand. 
A- THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
ALLOWED PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT TO STAND. 
It was not reversible error for the district court to allow the amended complaint to 
stand as the district court is broad granted discretion to extend deadlines. Rule 6(b) 
URCP states that the court may extend a deadline "with or without motion or notice" for 
good cause prior to the expiration of a deadline. Rule 6(b)(2) states that after the 
expiration of a deadline, the party may move the court for an extension based on 
excusable neglect. By filing the amended complaint beyond the deadline, the filing 
worked as an implied motion to extend the time. While not explicitly stating that the late 
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filing was due to excusable neglect, the filing was late due to Plaintiffs counsel believing 
he had been granted thirty (30) days to file the amended complaint. 
The district court was within its discretion to allow the amended complaint to 
stand as it did not prejudice the Defendant in any way, and the district court is granted 
broad discretion over deadlines under Rule 6(b) URCP. Therefore, it was not reversible 
error for the district court to allow the amended complaint to stand. 
B. DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE THE UNTIMELY FILING OF 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AT THE TRIAL LEVEL AND IS, 
THEREFORE, BARRED FROM RAISING IT ON APPEAL, 
The Defendant failed to object to the untimely filing of the amended complaint in 
any subsequent filings and, therefore, failed to preserve the issue for appeal. There are 
limited circumstances when a party may raise an issue on appeal without preserving the 
issue at trial. They are the "plain error/manifest error doctrine", the "exceptional 
circumstances" doctrine, and ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). 
None of these doctrines apply as the Defendant did not invoked any of them on 
appeal. Even if the they were to be raised in the reply brief, none would apply to the facts 
of this case. Therefore, Defendant's argument that Plaintiff's amended complaint was not 
timely filed should be disregarded by this Court as it was not preserved in the trial court. 
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2. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO 
CONSTRUE THE DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO THE AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AS A RULE 12(b) MOTION. 
Defendant contends that the district court should have construed Defendant's 
response to the amended complaint as a Rule 12 motion, invoking the additional time 
requirements of that rule. Such an argument is unfounded. (Brief of Appellant, page 25) 
Defendant filed a motion titled "Motion for Default Judgment and/or to Compel Answers 
to Request for Admissions and Production of Documents" on March 23, 2005. The 
content of that motion corresponds with its title. It petitioned the district court to have the 
Defendant's request for admissions deemed admitted and "default judgment" entered 
against the Plaintiff. Defendant cited Rules 36, 37, 54 and 55 URCP in support of her 
motion, not Rule 12 URCP. 
The district court could not have construed the March 23, 2005 filing as anything 
other than what the filing purported to be. The Defendant cited the rules appropriate for 
title of the motion, and the content of the motion made legal arguments consistent with 
the title. It is unreasonable for the Defendant to argue that the district court should have 
reviewed the motion as anything other than what it was. It would throw our legal system 
into chaos to require district court judges to identify every possible legal theory presented 
in a filing and presume what the party "really" meant to say. 
The district court could not have "reasonably inferred" from the language of the 
March 23, 2005 filing that the Defendant actually intended to file a completely different 
pleading than what was presented in the title and addressed in the motion and 
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memorandum. Therefore, Defendant's argument that the March 23, 2005 filing was 
actually a 12(b) motion in disguise, must fail. 
3. DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO THE AMENDED COMPLAINT DID 
NOT "GENERALLY DENY" PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES, 
Defendant argues that the March 23, 2005 filing was not the "sole answer," but 
that the April 5, 2005 filing titled "Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Judgment and Dependants Answer to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint" should be 
construed as an answer also. (Brief of Appellant, page 29). Defendant then argues that 
the district court should have considered statements from Defendant's response to the 
petition to confirm an arbitration award. (Brief of Appellant, page 29-30). The district 
court was correct not to review previous pleadings as Plaintiff presented a different cause 
of action in the amended complaint, rendering previous filings irrelevant. 
A. DEFENDANT'S APRIL 5,2005 FILING DOES NOT CONFORM TO 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN ANSWER AS DISCUSSED ABOVE. 
Defendant argues that the April 5, 2005 filing titled "Memorandum in Opposition 
to Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment and Dependants Answer to Plaintiffs Amended 
Complaint" generally denies the averments of the amended complaint. (Brief of 
Appellant, page 29-30). The statements made by the Defendant in the April 5, 2005 
filing do not satisfy the requirements of an answer as discussed above. Every statement 
made in that filing was made in the context of Plaintiffs's alleged failure to respond to 
discovery. Once again, the Defendant failed to provide a responsive answer to the 
amended complaint, but rather sought to have the discovery deemed admitted (again). 
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As discussed above, the district court cannot be expected to scour a filing in an attempt to 
construe the document as anything other that what it is on it's face. 
The April 5, 2005 filing, while stating that it is also an answer to the amended 
complaint, does not refute the averments of the amended complaint. In substance, it is 
another motion to have the matters deemed admitted for failure to respond to/discovery. 
Defendant argues at length, citing cases from other jurisdictions, that the court must 
liberally construe any pleading as an answer. Plaintiff freely admits that Defendant filed 
an answer but argues that the answer totally failed to address the averments of the 
amended complaint. 
Much of the case law presented is also irrelevant as it discusses default judgments. 
This case does not concern a default judgment as the Defendant filed two pleadings, both 
claiming to be answers. Plaintiff was granted judgment on the pleadings, not default 
judgment. Therefore, the case law regarding default judgment does not apply to this case. 
Therefore, the Defendant's argument that the April 5, 2005 filing prevented 
judgment on the pleadings is without merit and must fail. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AWARDED JUDGMENT ON 
THE PLEADINGS AS THE PLEADINGS WERE CLOSED. 
Judgment on the pleadings was properly awarded to Plaintiff as pleadings were 
closed in accordance with Rules 12(c) and 7 URCP. Rule 12(c) URCP states in part that 
"[a]fter the pleading are closed . . . any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." 
Rule 12(c) URCP, see also Cafferty v Hughes, 46 P.3d 233 (2002 UT App 105). Rule 7 
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provides a guide for required pleadings and motoins. It states "[there shall be a complaint 
and an answer." Rule 7(a) URCP. Rule 7 URCP then gives instructions on content and 
form of the motions and memoranda. See Rule 7(b-d) URCP 
In this case, Plaintiff filed and amended complaint on March 17, 2005. 
(Appellant's Brief, Appendix Exhibit No. 6) Defendant filed a document stating it was an 
answer to the amended complaint on March 23, 2005. (Appellant's Brief, Appendix 
Exhibit No. 7) Plaintiff filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings on March 25, 
2005. (Appellant's Brief, Appendix Exhibit No. 8) Defendant filed memorandum in 
opposition to Plaintiff motion for judgment on April 5, 2005. (Appellant's Brief, 
Appendix Exhibit No. 10) Plaintiff then submitted the matter for decision in accordance 
with Rule 7(d) URCP and the motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted on May 
3, 2005. (Appellant's Brief, Appendix Exhibit No. 12) 
The pleadings were "closed" within the meaning of Rule 12(c) URCP and the 
motion for judgment on the pleading was fully pleaded in accordance with Rule 7 URCP. 
Therefore, Defendant's argument that the pleadings were not "closed" is not supported by 
the record. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO THE PETITION TO CONFIRM AN 
ARBITRATION AWARD. 
Defendant claims that the district court should have looked back to filings 
regarding confirmation of an arbitration award to find denials of the averments made in 
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the amended complaint. Such a requirement is untenable as the motion to confirm an 
arbitration award was abandoned by the Plaintiff, resulting in the filing of the amended 
complaint. At the February 16, 2005 hearing, the parties agreed to have Plaintiff file an 
amended complaint. (Brief of Appellant, Exhibit No. 2, Tr. p. 38-39). At that hearing, 
the district court specifically instructed the Defendant to file an answer to the amended 
complaint. (Brief of Appellant, Exhibit No. 2, Tr. p. 39, lines 8-10). Expecting the 
district court to then go back to a previous filing in an attempt to find an "answer" is 
unreasonable when the district court has given specific instructions to the Defendant. 
Therefore, the district court was correct when it did not refer to prior filings to find 
statements to refute the amended complaint. 
D. DEFENDANT WAS SPECIFICALLY WARNED AT THE FEBRUARY 
16,2005 HEARING THAT HER FILINGS DID NOT CONFORM AND 
WAS ENCOURAGED TO SEEK COMPETENT LEGAL COUNSEL. 
Defendant was specifically warned at the February 16, 2005 hearing that her case 
could be prejudiced by failing to follow the rules of procedure and proper form of 
pleadings. (Appendix 1, Tr. pp. 42-43). The Defendant argues that rule 10(f) allows the 
clerk to waive the requirements as to the form of pleadings for pro se parties. (Brief of 
Appellant, Page 31). In fact, the Defendant acknowledged at the February 16, 2005 
hearing that she had "seen people lose cases strictly on terminology that they did not use 
in court." (Appendix 1, Tr. p. 43, lines 9-10). 
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From the transcript, it is apparent that the district court warned the Defendant of 
the risks of defending herself in court, and advised her to get an attorney. (Appendix 1, 
Tr. pp. 42-43). The Defendant cannot now appeal the decision, claiming that she should 
be given deference for defending herself. Therefore, the Defendant's argument that 
deference should be granted in construing her filings as containing elements of an answer 
to the amended complaint must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, this Court should deny Defendant's appeal. 
Addendum is attached and includes a portion of the February 16, 2005 hearing transcript. 
DATED: March 31, 2006 
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unauthorized practice. I can't tell you how many people I have 
referred to the Utah State Bar for their prosecution. I have 
one more from yesterday sitting on my desk. And I need to do a 
letter on that case where we, apparently, have got the 
secretary to a notary public doing guardianship papers. 
DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: Well, I can tell you I have not 
purchased anything. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: This is off — that's the 
wonderful and the bad thing about the internet, is you can find 
anything you want. And I swear on the Bible I have not paid. 
THE COURT: One thing that you are doing with your 
papers is the format's not entirely correct. It's something I 
can follow. But it's actually a format that the title for the 
documents, in other words, is more like they use in the state 
of Nevada. I can follow it that way. But I can also tell you 
that I have seen people lose their cases for the sole reason 
that they were relying on something off the internet, or, quite 
often, somebody else who is lurking in the shadows and, you 
know, playing with other people's cases. So my recommendation 
is, as it always is, get some legal advice from a professional 
who is licensed. 
DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: Yeah. 
THE COURT: I understand the limitations and the cost 
of that. 
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DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: Sometimes it's worth it. 
THE COURT: Well, what I always tell people or ask 
people, is if you have a toothache, do you go out in the garage 
and get out the Dremel tool and see what you can do with it? 
That's an exaggeration, of course. But, you know, this is a 
serious matter. And you would be better off with legal advice. 
But you are entitled to do the best you can by your own. 
DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: I think the preliminary, this 
stuff that we are going over, because I have seen people lose 
cases strictly on terminology that they did not use in court. 
That is why I had searched these things out to find out okay, 
what is the terminology that the courts want. And I appreciate 
your --
MR. NEFF: Then, Your Honor, if I could get the 
defendant's phone number and permission to call her with 
respect to the scheduling conference that may be down the road. 
THE COURT: Okay. That will be needed for the clerk 
also. Let's see, oh, that's one of the things, Miss Williams, 
that I need to have you start doing on your pleadings, and that 
is in the upper left hand, putting your name, address and phone 
number there. 
DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: Okay. 
THE COURT: So it identifies where these are coming 
from. 
DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: Okay. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Neff's has the customary format. It's 
just right above the name of the court. And if you'll start to 
include those, then he won't, of course, need to ask. 
DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: I see what you are saying. 
THE COURT: But you can get that after we are finished 
here. And make sure that Miss Williams gets notice of 
everything being filed. 
MR. NEFF: Shall I prepare an order? 
THE COURT: I think the minute entry will be fine. 
MR. NEFF: Okay. 
THE COURT: These three matters we have talked about 
today. All right. Anything else we need to discuss today? 
MR. NEFF: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
MR. NEFF: Thank you, Your Honor. 
44 
